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In 2005, a U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee agreed to shift the Carrier Air 
Wing Five (CVW-5) homeport from Atsugi Naval Air Station (NAS), Japan, to Marine 
Corps Air Station Iwakuni (MCASI), Japan, in 2016.  Currently the 35 mile distance 
between Atsugi, where the air wing is based and Yokosuka, where the carrier is docked, 
does not constitute a significant burden to the supply chain.  However, when CVW-5 
F/A-18 Hornets are repositioned to MCAS Iwakuni, it will significantly impact 
transportation costs due to the additional 542-mile distance to move Tool/IMRL assets to 
the carrier for air wing embarkation.  In the same timeframe of the air wing home port 
transition, the composition of the air wing will be evolving to become the Navy’s first 
unit comprised of all Hornet variant aircraft.  This analysis tries to determine the cost 
savings that may be involved with consolidation of Tool/IMRL outfitting allowances.  
Additionally, the analysis shows that MCAS Iwakuni may bring further asset exploitation 
opportunities due to the Marine Hornet squadrons already based there, whereas Atsugi 
has no Hornet presence other than CVW-5.   
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A. BACKGROUND  
On October 29, 2005, the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) 
reached an understanding on common goals and objectives and agreed to shift the 
homeport for Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) from Naval Air Facility (NAF) Atsugi, 
Japan, to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni (MCAS Iwakuni), Japan, in 2016 (Rice, 
Rumsfeld, Machimura, & Ohno, 2005).  This relocation will increase shipping costs of 
tools and individual material readiness list (IMRL) items with each associated deployment 
from the current 25 miles (the distance from NAF Atsugi) to approximately 537 miles (the 
distance from MCAS Iwakuni to Commander Fleet Activities Yokosuka [CFAY]).  In this 
project, we assume the typical CVW-5 deployment schedule. 
One of the principal reasons why CVW-5 fixed-wing assets are relocating to 
MCAS Iwakuni is due to the noise they make when conducting nighttime field landing 
carrier practice (FCLP) at NAF Atsugi.  Constant noise from this activity has been a 
concern of residents of Ayase, Yamato, and nearby communities for many years.  In an 
effort to ease some of the concerns and noise levels, the U.S. Navy and the government of 
Japan agreed to move nighttime landing practices to another location, with Iwo Jima 
heading the list as the leading candidate.  
There are three cities near NAF Atsugi that required immediate attention due to 
their increasing populations.  The city of Atsugi had a population of 208,627 in October 
1995 and that increased to 224,420 in October 2010 (Brinkhoff, 2011a).  Figure 1 shows 
the population growth of Atsugi from 1995 to 2010. 
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Figure 1.   Population Growth Chart of Atsugi  
(From Brinkhoff, 2011a) 
 
The city of Ebina had a population of 113,430 in October 1995, which increased to 
127,707 in October 2010 (Brinkhoff, 2011c).  Figure 2 shows the population growth of 
Ebina from 1995 to 2010. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Population Growth Chart of Ebina 
(From Brinkhoff, 2011c) 
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The city of Ayase had a population of 110,680 in October 1995, which increased 
to 129,167 in October 2010 (Brinkhoff, 2011b).  Figure 3 shows the population growth of 
Ayase from 1995 to 2010. 
 
Figure 3.   Population Growth Chart of Ayase 
(From Brinkhoff, 2011b) 
 
The objective of this project is to further leverage a prior thesis project titled Best 
Value Analysis of Movement Strategies for Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) from 
Iwakuni to Yokosuka, Japan (Debord, Coleman, & Hodge, 2011).  We use some of their 
findings for transportation and shipping costs to determine whether there is a cost 
savings to the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) of dual-sited equipage and, if so, 
whether there is an optimal mix of tools (IMRL) that can be spread among the fixed-
wing assets of CVW-5.    
1. Current Operational Picture 
The following major commands are institutional stakeholders in the topic of this 
thesis and are relevant in any decisions that the thesis data present.  
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a. United States Navy 7th Fleet 
The United States Navy’s 7th Fleet was established on March 15, 1943, 
and today it is the largest forward deployed U.S. fleet in the world.  It has an area of 
responsibility that includes the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans.  Commander, U.S. 7th 
Fleet participated in several Pacific campaigns, including the Battle of Leyte Gulf in the 
Philippines during World War II as the naval combatant commander under Supreme 
Commander Southwest Pacific Area, General Douglas MacArthur.  A few years later, on 
February 11, 1950, the force assumed the name that it holds today—United States Navy 
7th Fleet (Commander, United States Navy 7th Fleet, 2012b).  Figure 4 shows the key 
elements of the United States Navy 7th Fleet. 
 
Figure 4.   United States Navy 7th Fleet Elements 
(From Federation of American Scientists, 1999) 
 
The United States Navy’s 7th Fleet units have participated in every major 
military operation since being established in 1950.  During the Korean War, the first Navy 
jet aircraft used in combat was launched from a Task Force 77 carrier on July 3, 1950, and 
the famous landings in Inchon, Korea, were conducted by the United States Navy 7th 
Fleet amphibious ships.  The battleships USS Iowa (BB 61), USS New Jersey (BB 62), 
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USS Missouri (BB 63), and USS Wisconsin (BB 64) all served as flagships for 
Commander, United States Navy 7th Fleet during the Korean War.  This fleet has 
participated in all combat operations, including Vietnam and the Global War on Terrorism 
(Commander, United States Navy 7th Fleet, 2012b).  
Within hours of the March 11, 2011, devastating earthquake and tsunami 
that struck northern Japan, the United States Navy 7th Fleet mobilized 22 ships, 
132 aircraft, and more than 15,000 personnel to support the Japan Self-Defense Forces 
(JSDF) in the largest recovery effort in their history.  The relief operation that followed 
was named Operation Tomodachi, after the Japanese word for “friend” (Commander, 
United States Navy 7th Fleet, 2012b). This operation demonstrated the quick 
responsiveness and flexibility of the United States Navy 7th Fleet and showed the strong 
bonds that tie relations between the U.S. and Japan. 
b. NAF Atsugi 
NAF Atsugi is the only naval installation supporting an entire air wing and 
is located 25 miles northwest of CFAY.  It has been home to U.S. Navy personnel and 
their families for over 50 years. The base consists of approximately 1,249 acres and lies in 
the Kanto Plain region on Honshu, the main island of Japan.  NAF Atsugi’s strategic 
importance has been key to CVW-5’s success by providing state-of-the-art facilities, 
maintenance, and logistics services to support the “Tip of the Sword” in the Western 
Pacific (Commander, Navy Installations Command [CNIC], 2012b).  Figure 5 shows a 




Figure 5.   Relational Map of NAF Atsugi 
(From Ruskin & Strobel, 2011) 
 
c. Fleet Activities Yokosuka 
CFAY is a 560-acre forward deployed naval base located near Yokohama.  
It is the Navy’s largest, most strategically important overseas installation; CFAY has 
82 tenant commands assigned to support operating forces in the Western Pacific, from 
Hawaii to the Persian Gulf.  The base’s primary mission is to support the 11 high 
operational tempo warships forward deployed to Yokosuka and the United States Navy 
7th Fleet flagship, USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19; CNIC, 2012a).  Figure 6 shows an aerial 




Figure 6.   Aerial Map of Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka 
(From Powers, 2012) 
 
d. USS George Washington (CVN 73): Forward Deployed Carrier 
In September 2008, USS George Washington (CVN 73) replaced USS 
Kitty Hawk (CV 63) at a cross-decking ceremony in San Diego, making her the only 
forward deployed carrier in the Pacific (CNIC, 2012b).  Figure 7 shows the USS George 




Figure 7.   USS George Washington (CVN 73) Arriving New Homeport CFAY  
(From Davis, 2008) 
 
e. Carrier Air Wing Five 
CVW-5 has proudly earned the nickname as the nation’s only “911” air 
wing.  It is a combat strike element of the United States Navy’s 7th Fleet and is the 
nation’s only forward deployed carrier strike group.  CVW-5 consists of  Strike Fighter 
Squadron 27, Strike Fighter Squadron 115, and Strike Fighter Squadron 195, each flying 
F/A-18E Super Hornets; Strike Fighter Squadron 102, flying the F/A-18F Super Hornet; 
Electronic Attack Squadron 141, which will be flying the E/A-18G (Growler) in the near 
future; Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 115, flying the Hawkeye 2000; Fleet 
Logistics Support Squadron 30 Detachment 5, flying the C-2 Greyhound; and Helicopter 





been stationed at NAF Atsugi for over 28 years and is the only permanently forward 
deployed carrier air wing in the U.S. Navy.  Figure 8 shows CVW-5 fixed-wing assets 
flying over Mt. Fuji.  
 
 
Figure 8.   CVW-5 Aircraft Flying Over Mt. Fuji 
(From Airliners, 2011) 
 
f. Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni 
MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, is located approximately 600 miles southwest of 
Tokyo.  The base is home to almost half of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing that is 
headquartered on Okinawa, elements of the 3rd Force Service Support Group, Fleet  
Air Wing 31 of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), and other units of 
JMSDF.  The base is home to numerous F/A-18C/Ds.  It presently has approximately 
15,000 personnel, including Japanese national employees in five major tenants (U.S. 
Marine Corps [USMC], 2012a).  Figure 9 shows an overhead view of MCAS Iwakuni.  
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Figure 9.   Overhead View of MCAS Iwakuni 
(From Military Bases, 2012) 
 
(1) The Mission of Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack 
Squadron 242 (VMFA-242) is “to support the MAGTF commander by providing 
supporting arms coordination, conducting reconnaissance, and destroying surface targets 
and enemy aircraft day or night under all weather conditions during expeditionary, joint, 
or combined operations” (USMC, 2012b). 
(2) The Mission of Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG 12) is “to 
conduct anti-air warfare and offensive air support operations in support of Fleet Marine 
Forces from advanced base, expeditionary airfields or aircraft carriers and conduct such 
air operations as may be directed” (USMC, 2012b). 
(3) The Mission of Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 
12 (MALS 12) is “to provide aviation logistics expertise, planning and material to MAG-
 11
12 and its subordinate tactical aircraft squadrons in order to support operational 
contingencies, theater security cooperation plans, and training exercises in the Pacific 
Command area of responsibility” (USMC, 2012b). 
(4) The Mission of Marine Wing Support Squadron 
171 (MWSS 171) is to provide all essential Aviation Ground Support requirements to a 
designated fixed-wing component of an aviation combat element and all supporting or 
attached elements of the Marine Air Control Group. Additionally, the squadron has the 
implied mission to supplement airbase facilities and services at MCAS Iwakuni. Forming 
an essential element of Marine Wing Support Group 17 and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 
Marine Wing Support Squadron 171 routinely fulfills its demanding responsibilities in 
Iwakuni and also in deployed locations around the Pacific Rim (USMC, 2012b).  
The Marine Corps Aviation Ground Support performs the following 
14 functions (USMC, 2012b): 
  1. internal airfield communications; 
  2. weather services; 
  3. expeditionary air fields (EAF) services;  
  4. aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF); 
  5. aircraft and ground refueling; 
  6. explosive ordnance disposal; 
  7. essential engineer services;  
  8. motor transport;  
  9. field mess facilities;  
10. sick-call and aviation medical functions; 
11. individual/unit training of organic and selected personnel;  
12. nuclear, biological, and chemical defense;  
13. security and law enforcement services; and  
14. air base commandant functions.  
 
(5) The mission of Marine Wing Support Group 17 (MWSG 17) 
is “to provide essential ground support requirements (less aircraft supply, maintenance, 
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and ordnance) to a designated MAW. The MWSG is organized and equipped for 
employment as an integral unit in support of the MAW” (USMC, 2012b). 
g. Maintenance Labor 
Japanese workers on U.S. military bases in Japan are hired under bilateral 
labor contracts, the master labor contract (MLC) and the indirect hire agreement (IHA).  
MLC positions are open only to permanent residents of Japan who are not U.S. civilian 
employees for the military, Service members, or their family members.  IHA positions are 
available to permanent residents of Japan who are not U.S. citizens.  The unique nature of 
the labor agreements has caused friction, at times, between Japanese employees and U.S. 
supervisors.  There are approximately 8,900 MLC and IHA employees working on 
23 military facilities, according to the Labor Management Office, the Japanese 
government’s labor administration office for MLC and IHA workers for U.S. Forces Japan 
(Sumida, 2004). 
2. Pending Operational Picture 
As a direct result of the U. S.–Japan SCC document of October 29, 2005 (Rice et 
al., 2005), the Navy will relocate approximately 64 CVW-5 fixed-wing assets from NAF 
Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni in 2016.  Figure 10 shows a relational map between the current 
situation in Atsugi and the future location for CVW-5 fixed-wing aircraft. The move will 
not affect the helicopter squadrons because they will remain at NAF Atsugi.  Figure 10 




Figure 10.   Relational Map of U.S. Military Bases in Japan  
(From Debord, Coleman, & Hodge, 2011) 
 
When CVW-5 relocates in 2016 to MCAS Iwakuni, the standard operating 
procedure for them would be to take their entire tools/IMRL equipage with them.  In this 
project, we examine the current tools/IMRL transportation process, CVW-5 transportation 
options, along with CVW-5 transportation options, and the redundancies and costs 
associated with these options.  This analysis may be used as a decision and evaluation tool 
to support the procurement, distribution, and accountability policy for CVW-5’s fixed-
wing tools/IMRL.  
3. About This Thesis 
In this project, we analyze Tools/IMRL requirements for CVW-5 fixed-wing 
assets, and we determine whether there is a more beneficial quantity and distribution of 
these assets throughout the dual sites of CFAY–MCAS Iwakuni.  In Chapter II, we outline 
our assumptions and data-collection techniques. 
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II. TOOL/INDIVIDUAL MATERIAL READINESS LIST 
PRACTICES 
 The function of the second chapter is to provide an understanding of the classes of 
material utilized in the maintenance and material support of an air wing and the level of 
oversight provided for the oversight of these materials.  The limitations that governing 
references and responsible entities impose must be understood and addressed prior to 
making any changes to outfitting quantities and procedures as they exist under the current 
paradigm.  
A. INDIVIDUAL MATERIAL READINESS LIST 
IMRL items are a subset of the class of items known as aircraft maintenance 
material readiness list (AMMRL) items (Commander, Naval Air Forces [CNAF], 2009).  
AMMRL items encompass a wide range of assets used at all levels of aviation 
maintenance, from large ground-support equipment (GSE) items, such as hydraulic 
generators, to intricate test program sets (TPS) used in the repair of complex electronic 
weapons replaceable assemblies (WRA).  The primary objective of the AMMRL program 
is to provide operational IMRL support equipment to satisfy flight and personal safety 
requirements in direct support of mission effectiveness (CNAF, 2008).  Across the fleet, 
there are approximately 37,000 discrete line items of AMMRL assets that are managed 
and used in aircraft maintenance evolutions at all levels (CNAF, 2009).  Many IMRL 
assets are very specialized to a particular application and, therefore, have a scarcity and 
high cost associated with their procurement.  For this reason, the Navy maintains 
databases at two levels to track these assets, as well as implements stringent requirements 
directing inventory managers to maintain strict control of their assigned catalog of items. 
1. Governing References 
The primary reference governing the management of AMMRL, and by  
extension IMRL, assets is the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) 
COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2A CH-2 (CNAF, 2009).  In the third chapter of this 
report, we cover maintenance concepts, programs and processes, maintenance unit 
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departments, division organization, manpower management, and aviation officers; the 
applicable section is the area on programs and processes.  The NAMP functions as a high-
level guidance document for the programs it covers, and the details of individual programs 
are governed by specific references indicated by the NAMP for adherence to applicable 
standard operating procedures.  In the case of AMMRL, the NAMP refers readers to the 
NAVAIRINST 13650.1 series for allowance and inventory control procedures, to the 
NAVAIRINST 13680.1 series for rework procedures, and to the NAVAIR 17-35MTL-1 
series for calibration requirements of AMMRL assets (CNAF, 2009). 
2. Coding of Assets 
IMRL assets are assigned single-digit alphabetic codes to designate the type of 
item covered and to provide additional information on the type of transaction required for 
requisitioning the item (CNAF, 2008).  The codes themselves are tied to supply and 
financial records for accountability purposes.  The type of IMRL assets that are assigned 
reporting codes are the ones that are allocated to intermediate maintenance activities 
(IMA) and Fleet Readiness Centers (FRCs) for sub-custody to other activities (CNAF, 
2009).  The primary custody codes used are the following: 
a. Code P 
Large items, in excess of 200 pounds for immobilized equipment or 
300 pounds for wheeled equipment, which exceed certain storage size authorizations.  
This category of IMRL also includes assets that are too fragile or likely to have their 
calibration coverage voided through misalignment during movement, limiting their 
transportability.  Assets of this category are checked out to hosted commands by the 
applicable IMA when required for local operation (CNAF, 2008). 
b. Code D 
Items in a detachment list that have a code of D or E.  The D code allows 
items assigned to a specific detachment to be grouped together for management, but this 
code is still subject to the same requirements of a P-coded item (CNAF, 2008). 
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c. Code E 
Infrequently used items that are utilized on an average periodicity of less 
than once per month.  These items are provided to the cognizant IMA and checked-out 
only to hosted activities for immediate use (CNAF, 2008). 
d. Code M 
Generic IMRL items that are not calibrateable and that are not covered by 
any other custody code.  These units are issued and used in conjunction with calibrateable 
items (CNAF, 2008). 
e. Code N 
IMRL items that do not require calibration and are not covered by any 
other custody code (CNAF, 2008). 
f. Code L 
Items that do require calibration and management and are sub-custodied to 
organizational activities for use both while deployed and in homeport which are not 
covered by any other custody code (CNAF, 2008). 
3. Responsible Levels 
The list that follows describes the primary levels associated with IMRL program 
management and compliance.  We highlight the principal responsibilities of these parties 
in this thesis, but a full listing of responsibilities can be found in the NAMP and the 
NAVAIRINST 13650.1 series publication. 
a. Aviation Support Equipment Program Manager 
The activity designated as the overall aviation SE program manager is 
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM (PMA-260).  PMA-260 holds responsibilities at all levels of the 
support equipment life cycle, from initial design through development and testing, and 
into operational use. PMA-260’s responsibility concludes only with asset disposition upon 
retirement.  PMA-260 is also responsible for the funding of initial IMRL procurement of 
all covered activities.  As part of the PMA-260 management of the operational life of a 
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support equipment asset, this activity also governs the technical documentation and 
training necessary to field the equipment and keep it in a useful status (CNAF, 2009). 
b. Support Equipment Controlling Authority 
The support equipment controlling authority (SECA) maintains an accurate 
accounting in the support equipment resource management information system (SERMIS) 
for all equipment in the custody of its responsible commands.  By extension, the SECA is 
responsible for determining the authorized allowance of IMRL for weapons systems 
operated in its area of responsibility; the SECA must first approve any transfers of 
equipment or requests for asset augmentation prior to execution.  Compliance with 
AMMRL procedures is accomplished thorough training provided to area commanders and 
a monthly transaction report verification conducted with reporting activities (CNAF, 
2008).  
c. Area Commander 
The area commander is the appointed representative for the SECA within a 
specific geographic area of responsibility.  The Area Commander ensures that subordinate 
activities remain in compliance with standard AMMRL procedures by making certain that 
only knowledgeable and qualified personnel are assigned to positions of authority in 
program management.  A large component of this compliance is the maintenance of 
accurate Local Asset Management System (LAMS) files within the organizations as well 
as quarterly generated back-up records.  Another, and also important, compliance 
requirement by the Area Commander is to ensure the accurate processing of the 
mandatory wall-to-wall IMRL inventories at the appropriate level and within prescribed 
periodicities (CNAF, 2008). 
d. Activity Level 
Physical compliance with AMMRL program requirements is accomplished 
at this level through interaction between the maintenance officer, respective division 
officers, work center supervisors, material control, and the assigned IMRL asset manager.  
At the top of the activity hierarchy, the maintenance officer (MO) must appoint an IMRL 
asset manager at least 30 days prior to the departure of the previous IMRL manager.  The 
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assigned manager must be an E-5 or above and hold the IMRL management Naval 
Enlistment Code 9590.  The requirement for the overlap is to enable the prospective 
manager to become familiar with the IMRL condition within the command prior to the 
departure of the previous subject-matter expert.  The maintenance officer must also sign as 
the responsible officer on all surveys (DD Form 200) that are submitted for IMRL 
discrepancies (CNAF, 2008). 
Division officers administratively maintain all IMRL for their assigned 
divisions and report compliance status to the maintenance officer for the completion of 
program requirements.  The principal agents of the division officer in program compliance 
are the individual work center supervisors.  The division officer reviews IMRL documents 
prior to up-line submission (CNAF, 2008). 
The work center supervisors are the frontline IMRL managers who 
maintain an accurate listing of all assigned assets.  They are charged with conducting the 
physical inventories and initiating the surveys for any discrepancies with assigned gear 
(CNAF, 2008). 
The material control work center supervisor is responsible for ensuring the 
activity’s compliance with AMMRL procedures and reporting its conformance to the 
maintenance officer.  The IMRL asset manager is the agent who spearheads compliance 
activities.  In addition to verifying the compliance of other activity levels with program 
requirements, the asset manager also performs administrative tasks to keep the activity on 
track, such as maintaining a 100% local asset management system (LAMS)-to-support 
equipment resource management information system (SERMIS) accuracy and submitting 
IMRL disposition requests as necessary.  Due to their superior knowledge of the program, 
asset managers provide program training to all activity personnel (CNAF, 2008). 
4. Outfitting 
Outfitting entails the procedures in place to achieve the equipage of valid IMRL 




(1) Push—Assets purchased through NAVAIR-appropriate funds with 
no charge to the recipient activity.  The support equipment controlling authority (SECA) 
and NAVAIR determine how assets should be allocated according to need, and site 
activation teams or the actual manufacturer of the equipment deliver the resources (CNAF, 
2008). 
(2) Pull—Performed with IMRL funding provided to an activity to 
ensure adequate material exists to cover maintenance activities and to facilitate the support 
of hosted activities (CNAF, 2008). 
(3) Redistribution—The transfer of excess materials from one existing 
activity to another and the repurposing of material from eliminated activities (CNAF, 
2008). 
(4) Local manufacture—Assets that are not procured in their final form 
from a commercial source but are manufactured at the local level using technical data 
from the Naval Air Technical Data and Engineering Services Command (CNAF, 2008). 
b. Occasion 
(1) Initial outfitting—The function of providing IMRL assets to 
newly established activities under the coverage of an SECA.  The SECA determines the 
asset requirements of the prospective activity approximately one year prior to its 
implementation and provisions the activity through either push or redistribution channels 
(CNAF, 2008). 
(2) Re-outfitting—This process results from changes in the 
scope of an SECA-supported activity in which new requirements or operating 
environment changes nullify the previously existing IMRL authorization for the activity.  
Approximately one year prior to the change, the SECA will assess requirements driven by 
the changes in the supported activity’s position and outfit the activity to the proper level 




5. Tracking Databases 
The Navy uses two databases to track and allocate AMMRL based on the needs of 
fleet end users.  The SERMIS is the higher level database SECAS use that contains 
information that subordinate activities provide up line (CNAF, 2009).  The LAMS 
database is operated and maintained by local element commands as a method of updating 
the SERMIS and ensuring that a full picture of material availability is provided fleet wide 
(CNAF, 2008).  The key source data that links the two databases is the Support Equipment 
Transaction Report (OPNAV 4790/64; CNAF, 2009).  The existence of this form’s fields 
in both databases enables one to feed the other.  Further explanation of each program is 
provided in the following list. 
a. Support Equipment Resource Management Information System 
The SERMIS is a program fielded by COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PMA 
260EA to identify and catalog the technical items used by all organizational, intermediate, 
and depot-level maintenance activities to perform repairs and upkeep on Navy aviation 
assets.  The purpose of the data contained in the system is to provide SECAs with 
inventory control oversight into source, allowance, and inventory data from an electronic 
perspective (CNAF, 2009).  In addition to the asset-tracking features of LAMS, the 
broader-scope architecture of the SERMIS facilitates redistribution of assets across 
activities, enables the scheduling of rework for listed assets, and makes configuration 
management of resources possible across varying platforms. 
b. Local Asset Management System  
The LAMS is also a computer-based program fielded by 
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM, but its purpose is the management of assets at the local 
command level, rather than on a fleet-wide basis.  To standardize input to the SERMIS 
from the numerous individual AMMRL controlling commands, the LAMS is the only 
program authorized for use at the local level, and all support equipment transactions must 
be processed in this system.  Prompt transaction report updates within this system ensure 
inventory accuracy across the aviation enterprise (CNAF, 2009). 
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6. Transfer Procedure 
The transfer of IMRL from the permanent custody of one activity to another can be 
performed only under the direction of the SECA.  Transfer authority is requested from the 
SECA through the completion of a formal IMRL revision request (IRR) on the part of the 
activity appealing for a tailoring of their asset allowance in an amount either upward or 
downward of what they are currently allotted.  The processing of the IRR, as with all 
AMMRL actions at the activity level, is conducted within the LAMS to ensure uniformity 
across all fleet-level users.  Once the SECA has issued transfer authority, the losing 
activity must perform a transfer inspection on the selected items and transport them in a 
ready-for-issue status to the nearest local supply department within 30 days.  If the items 
cannot be shipped within the standard 30-day interval, a detailed explanation must be 
presented to the SECA specifying the reason and requesting an extension.  The deadline 
for transmission of a message notifying the SECA of the non-availability of the identified 
assets is 15 working days from the date that the transfer notification was authorized.  If the 
asset transferred requires a historical record (OPNAV 4790/51) for annotating the usage of 
the item, then the original copy of that record must also be transferred to the gaining 
activity.  The gaining activity is required to proactively monitor the LAMS for incoming 
items and to request a survey for in-transit loss if items are not received within 180 days of 
the transfer authorization.  The gaining activity must perform an acceptance inspection on 
items received; if items are received in any condition other than ready for immediate use, 
then the gaining activity is also tasked with contacting the SECA for further direction.  
The return of non-functional items to the point of origin without SECA approval is 
unauthorized (CNAF, 2008).  
7. Accountability Requirement 
For proper accountability of IMRL assets, inventories must be conducted at certain 
mandatory intervals.  Further inventories during daily usage are recommended but not 
required under the guidelines of the AMMRL program.  All occasions for IMRL inventory 
must be performed in a wall-to-wall format, so named because the physical location of all 
items the activity is accountable for must be physically verified (CNAF, 2009). The four 
requisite intervals for inventory are as follows: 
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a. Annual Inventory 
Completion of the annual inventory is reported to the SECA and must be 
done once every calendar year, with the additional restriction that 18 months cannot be 
exceeded between performances of subsequent inventories (CNAF, 2008). 
b. Maintenance Officer Relief Inventory 
The maintenance office relief inventory is conducted as part of the turnover 
process between maintenance officers and has a completion deadline of 30 days from the 
assignment of the new maintenance officer.  This inventory can be performed in 
conjunction with the annual requirement, and no outside reporting is required of this 
inventory unless it is also used as the annual inventory (CNAF, 2008). 
c. Work Center Quarterly Inventory 
The work center inventory is performed once each quarter of the calendar 
year to report the condition of all IMRL assigned to the work center and in its custody.  
Compliance is the division officer’s responsibility and is reported to the maintenance 
officer (CNAF, 2008). 
d. Sub-Custody Quarterly Inventory 
The sub-custody inventory is performed once each quarter of the calendar 
year to report the condition of all IMRL assets assigned to activities that have been 
checked out to another hosted activity.  Compliance is the responsibility of the 
maintenance material control officer of the hosted activity and is reported to the 
maintenance officer of the hosting activity (CNAF, 2008). 
B. TOOLS 
The Tool Control Program (TCP) is based on the concept of a family of 
specialized toolboxes and pouches configured for instant inventory before and after each 
maintenance action.  The content and configuration of each container is tailored to the 




to and maintained within a work center.  However, if considered necessary and space 
permits, a tool control center (tool room) may be established (Commander, Naval Air 
Systems Command, 2004). 
 There are numerous maintenance actions that may be required to service and repair 
Navy and Marine Corps aircraft.  There could be hundreds of different types of 
maintenance requirements, each with its own unique set of tools.  In addition, space 
limitations on an aircraft carrier necessitate the use of compact toolboxes containing only 
the necessary tools required for each specific maintenance action.  NAVAIR Lakehurst is 
responsible for designing and developing customized toolboxes and manuals to 
accommodate maintenance and tooling requirements for most Navy aircraft and their 
support equipment.  Information is taken from the tool control manuals and used to design 
toolboxes for specific maintenance tasks listed in the manuals.  This eliminates the need 
for toolboxes containing tools that are not needed, which saves money, time, and space.  
Each tool has an assigned location within the toolbox to help keep track of all the tools 
within the box and quickly identify any missing tools. The NAVAIR Lakehurst team is 
currently working on developing toolkits for a number of Navy aircraft programs, which 
include the V-22, F-18, T-45, and H-60 support equipment programs (Naval Air Warfare 
Center, 2010). 
1. Governing References 
The primary reference governing the management of tools used for aviation 
maintenance purposes is the NAMP.  The NAMP functions as a high-level guidance 
document for the programs it covers. The details of individual programs are governed by 
specific references that the NAMP indicates for adherence to applicable standard 
operating procedures.  In the case of tools, the NAMP refers readers to the Naval Air 
Systems Command (NAVAIR) Tool Control Manual series (CNAF, 2009). 
a. Naval Aviation Maintenance Program 
The NAMP is sponsored and directed by the Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) and is implemented by Commander, Naval Air Forces (COMNAVAIRFOR). The 
Commander, Naval Air Forces Instruction (COMNAVAIRFORINST) 4790.2 series 
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(CNAF, 2009) addresses maintenance policies, procedures, and responsibilities for the 
conduct of the NAMP at all levels of maintenance throughout naval aviation.  It is 
considered the bible of naval aviation maintenance and takes precedence over all other 
aviation-related maintenance manuals (CNAF, 2009). 
b. Tool Control Program 
The TCP establishes policy and responsibilities for implementing, 
maintaining, controlling, storing and replacing common hand tools.  It is applicable to all 
Navy and Marine Corps O-level and IMA/commander, Fleet Readiness Center 
(COMFRC) activities performing or supporting aircraft maintenance.  In addition, the 
TCP applies to all commercial and other government activities that perform contract 
maintenance, production, or other type of support functions on naval aircraft.  The purpose 
of the TCP program is to assist the warfighter by providing an instant inventory capability 
through tool containers that have been internally tailored with each specific tool 
positioned in a unique location.  These tool locations are typically silhouetted and provide 
a quick and accurate method for identifying tools that are missing, because missing tools 
can cause catastrophic results to aircrew and/or aircraft. The primary objectives of the 
TCP are to heighten safety by eliminating accidents and equipment damage attributed to 
uncontrolled tools and minimizing tool-replacement costs.  As per the CNAF, an effective 
TCP is the responsibility of all maintenance personnel at every level of the chain of 
command (CNAF, 2009). 
(1) NAVAIR 17, Tool Control Manuals (Series) 
The information presented in these NAVAIR 17 manuals includes 
procedures, methods, and detailed instructions for the operation of the tool control 
program; the duties of key personnel; materials lists; container identification; and tool 
container/fixture fabrication instructions, container layouts, and tool inventories. The 
procedures contained in these manuals have previously proven themselves to be effective 
and are necessary for the positive control and accountability of tools (Commander, Naval 
Air Forces, 2009). 
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(2) NAVAIR 17-1FA18-1  
NAVAIR 17-1FA18-1 (Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, 2007) 
is the Aircraft Tool Control Manual for all Navy and Marine Corps F-18 Aircraft.  The 
purpose of this technical manual is to present the TCP for Navy and Marine aviation 
organizational maintenance activities.  The main objective of the TCP is the prevention of 
the aircraft accidents, incidents, and foreign object damage (FOD) that have been factors 
when tools were left unaccounted for.  Some additional benefits that are realized by 
compliance with the procedures in the manual are the reduction of pilferage, initial 
outfitting costs, in-use inventories, tool replacement costs, and maintenance man-hours.  
The reduction of any of these items makes significant contributions to cost effectiveness 
(Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, 2007). 
(3) NAVAIR 17-1E2C-1  
NAVAIR 17-1E2C-1 (Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, 2004) is 
the Aircraft Tool Control Manual for all Navy and Marine Corps E2C Hawkeye Aircraft.  
It fulfills the same objectives as the F/A-18 series manuals, but for the Hawkeye platform.   
2. Compliance with these Tool Control Manuals  
Compliance with and implementation of these tool control manuals is the 
responsibility of the respective aviation squadrons who are designated as the aircraft 
controlling custodian (ACC) and/or the type commander (TYCOM).  These requirements 
are established in Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction   OPNAVINST 
4790.2 (Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, 2004). 
3. Responsibilities: O-Level, I-Level, and COMFRC Activities 
a. Aircraft Controlling Custodians 
ACCs may designate subordinate activities as tool control model managers 




b. The Maintenance Officer/Fleet Readiness Center Equivalent 
The MO/FRC equivalent develops local command procedures, when 
necessary, which outline a comprehensive, integrated, and monitored TCP in areas where 
tooling is required for the performance of aircraft, aircraft component, and related 
equipment maintenance, rework, and installation.  (It is during the development of 
command procedures that any pooling of resources between similar T/M/S aircraft and co-
location of resources may be identified; CNAF, 2009.) 
c. The Assistant Maintenance Officer/Industrial Training 
Department  
The assistant maintenance officer/industrial training department provides 
all the required training requirements on the TCP to all aviation maintenance personnel.  
In particular, the training provided emphasizes personnel TCP responsibilities and missing 
tool procedures (CNAF, 2009). 
d. The Maintenance Material Control Officer /Production Control 
Officer  
The maintenance material control officer (MMCO)/production control 
officer establishes tool control centers, when necessary, and is designated as the approving 
authority to add, delete, or modify tools.  These tool room establishments are usually 
manned by Sailors from work centers and are not necessarily provided for in the 
squadron’s manpower documents.  This can lead to each F/A-18 squadron having its own 
unique tool room, each carrying similar items of tools/IMRL (CNAF, 2009). 
e. The Program Manager/Coordinator  
The program manager/coordinator designates in writing a TCP 
coordinator/subject-matter expert (SME) and ensures the proper operation of the tool 
control work center.  Additionally, he or she reviews all aviation fleet maintenance (AFM) 
fund purchases or FRC operations and maintenance/Navy (O&MN) requisitions submitted 
by the TCP coordinator for the purchase of spare or replacement tools to screen for any 
unauthorized or excess tool purchases.  AFM funds are used to maintain and support the 
U.S. Navy’s fleet of operational aircraft.  Other responsibilities of the program 
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manager/coordinator are to budget and plan AFM funds for O-level aviation activities or 
O&MN for FRCs in the procurement of approved tool containers and hand tools (CNAF, 
2009). 
4. TCP Implementation 
When a tool control manual (TCM) does not exist for a specific T/M/S aircraft, the 
reporting custodian develops a local TCM and is submitted via his or her chain of 
command to the cognizant type-wing for approval.  All Navy and Marine Corps aviation 
activities utilizing NAVAIR 17 series TCMs identify the particular tools they require 
using the tool inventory list that the TCM provides.   Intermediate maintenance activities 
ashore and activities that are not on an established TCM determine the tools necessary to 
perform repetitive tasks in each work center and develop a local tool inventory list.  These 
lists identify each tool by item number, nomenclature, specific quantity, and national stock 
number (NSN).  Each tool is etched whenever physically possible, including all pieces of 
a set.  This procedure can be very tedious and time consuming when multiple type boxes 
are designated for a work center.  Tools that are too small to etch are identified by an 
asterisk (*) in the tool container inventory list (CNAF, 2009). 
5. Tool Containers 
All Navy and Marine Corps aviation activities utilizing NAVAIR 17 series TCMs 
shall establish tool container configurations per the TCM.  It is mandatory that all 
hardware placements, such as clips and brackets, and the drilling of holes are exactly as 
indicated in the drawings.  These tool containers must be numbered with the applicable 
aviation organization code, work center code, and container number (for example,  
AC3-110-2).  If the work center authorizes more than one of the same type tool  
container, the additional containers are identified with a numerical suffix (for example, 
AC3-110-2-1). In addition, the position of each individual tool is silhouetted against a 
contrasting background to assist in identifying any missing tools and to ensure an accurate 
inventory.  Every individual tool location is numbered with a corresponding number on 
the tool container inventory list.  A copy of the TCM inventory list, TCM diagram, and 
tool container shortage list is placed and firmly attached within all tool containers so that 
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they do not become sources of FOD.  A brief explanation of FOD and the dangers it poses 
is explained at the end of this section (CNAF, 2009). 
6. Proposed Changes, Deviations, and Additions 
The warfighter is encouraged to suggest improvements to the NAVAIR 17 series 
manuals.  Any proposed changes in the tool inventory and/or container layout diagrams 
must be sent by technical publications deficiency report (OPNAV 4790/66), with 
appropriate justification, via the appropriate wing commander and ACC/TYCOM for 
approval/disapproval.  These procedures are established in the Discrepancy Reporting 
Program in the NAMP.  Any requests for deviation for activities with unique operational 
situations and/or more than one type aircraft is submitted, with appropriate justification, 
via the appropriate wing commander to the ACC/TYCOM for evaluation and/or approval 
as required (Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, 2004). 
7. Foreign Object Damage 
FOD is defined as a substance, debris, or article alien to the vehicle or system that 
would potentially cause damage. FOD is any damage attributed to a foreign object that can 
be expressed in physical or economic terms and that may or may not degrade the product’s 
required safety and/or performance characteristics.  Typically, FOD is an aviation term 
used to describe debris on or around an aircraft, or damage done to an aircraft (FOD 
Control Corporation, 2007). 
 FOD has been a part of naval aviation accidents since the earliest days of flight, 
whether it was propeller nicks, tire damage, or tears to airframe fabric, but FOD actually 
started getting the visibility it needed with the introduction of the jet engine. FOD 
includes loose hardware, extra parts, pieces of runways, pens, coins, garbage, and 
wildlife.  Basically, anything that can cause damage to an aircraft engine, flight controls, 
or fuel systems falls under the definition of FOD.  FOD can be found anywhere in the 
aviation environment, from the runway to the manufacturing plant and hangars.  FOD 
damage has often resulted in catastrophic events, leading to loss of life and valuable 
equipment.  The National Aerospace FOD Prevention Inc. estimates the cost of FOD to 
the global aerospace industry at $4 billion annually.  This sum is due mainly to repairing 
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aircraft engine damage caused by the ingestion of FOD.  The FOD program in naval 
aviation came into being due to the fact that almost all FOD incidents are entirely 
preventable (FOD Control Corporation, 2007). 
 In the following chapter, we will discuss the primary data sources and analysis 
techniques used in our model. 
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III. METHODOLOGY AND REFERENCE DATA 
The third chapter of this document encompasses the primary data sources, analysis 
techniques, and assumptions upon which our analysis of the tool and IMRL outfitting 
procedures are based.  We list methodology that is common to all analysis formats to 
prevent redundancy when switching between evaluation techniques.  We introduce any 
analysis techniques or assumptions that are peculiar to a specific model in Chapter IV at 
the same time as the model itself.  
A. DATA SOURCES 
The primary resources listed in the data sources section were our informational 
foundation when constructing this document.  The persons listed by name or title are the 
subject matter experts in their specific area and the publications are the governing 
reference for their respective discipline.  Clarification of assumptions integral to the 
calculations of this document can be referred back to these sources of expert knowledge 
for verification of policy adherence. 
1.  Brian Kudrna  
The primary point of contact for interface between our project research team and 
the CVW-5/Marine Activity Group (MAG)-12 Integrated Transition Team for 
Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF)/Commander, Naval Air Force Pacific (CNAP) in 
San Diego.  Kudrna coordinated and consolidated all information requests that were made 
to gather source data on CVW-5 transition planning.  Additionally, he spearheaded our 
drive to collect cost data for aerospace maintenance materials. 
2. Raymond D. Wendrzycki 
NAVAIR Aircraft Tool Control Program Manager. Wendryzycki provided all 





3. David A. Dougherty 
CSFWP IMRL Manager. Dougherty provided all Hornet IMRL data, including 
cube dimensions and costs for all CVW-5 Hornets and fixed-wing assets.  
4. CVW-5 Maintenance Officer 
Subject-matter expert and decision authority for air wing maintenance planning.  
Michael Washington provided the research team with information specific to CVW-5 
operations and requirements through interaction with Brian Kudrna. 
5. CNAF Publications 
Referenced for regulations and procedures governing the materials used in 
aerospace maintenance under Navy cognizance.  
6.  Type/Model/Series Publications 
Provided information peculiar to the individual classes and variants of aircraft 
comprising CVW-5. 
7. NAF Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni Transition Planning Documents 
Provided data relating to the reason, timeframe, and magnitude of the air wing 
relocation, which we could analyze for planning purposes. 
B. ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES 
One of the goals of NAVAIR’s “Supporting Sea Power-21” is to reduce the cost of 
doing business throughout the NAE.  One tool is AIRSpeed, which is a philosophy, 
strategy and a proven set of tools that enables NAVAIR and the NAE to achieve cost-wise 
readiness.  It is a means of reducing the cost of doing business, improving productivity, 
and increasing customer satisfaction.  The NAE is guided by NAVAIR AIRSpeed, which 
emphasizes applying the tools of continuous process improvement to non-production, 
transactional service environments.  Utilizing theory of constraints, Lean, and Six Sigma 
methodologies, personnel at all levels are improving ways to change how the NAE does 
business at every level of the organization: headquarters, business unit, department, 
program office, and integrated product team.  Just because a process has been done a 
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certain ways for years, it does not mean that it must not be under constant, vigilant review.  
There might be cost savings that could be realized to the NAE if the process were 
improved or if unnecessary steps were removed.  Some of these unnecessary steps that are 
considered waste in Lean/Six Sigma go by the acronym of TIMWOOD: Transportation, 
Inventory, Motion, Waiting, Over-Production, Over-Processing, and Defects (Miller, 
2007).  The analysis, removal, or reduction of any of these seven forms of waste can 
reduce overall costs, resulting in savings that may be reallocated in a more efficient 
manner.  AIRSpeed also emphasizes continuous process improvement (CPI), which is 
another tool that is often used to fix problems; it is easily available to all personnel and 
can deliver significant benefits (CNAF, 2012). The use of many of these AIRSpeed 
methodologies in this analysis may assist decision-makers in determining the best course 
of action on whether CVW-5 should procure a duplicate set of tools (IMRL) or whether 
there is a better mix of alternative actions.  Figure 11 depicts the seven wastes known by 
the acronym TIMWOOD.  
 





1. Valuation of Duplicated Assets 
The valuation of a duplicate set of tools and IMRL assets for carrier-deployed 
usage by CVW-5 can be viewed from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives.  
Neither viewpoint can decisively conclude the correct equipage level for the air wing, but 
the valuation to stakeholders under the represented categories provides a framework in 
which a purchasing decision can be empirically approached. 
a. Monetary Criteria 
The most concrete criteria from which to make a decision from a business 
perspective are monetary, but the results gleaned from financial analysis can be difficult to 
quantify in the public sector (Arsham, 1994).  Although the goal of most private-sector 
ventures to produce a return on investment greater than the invested capital can be clearly 
measured and compared to benchmarks, the success of public enterprises defies such 
clear-cut valuation (Rainey, 1983).  Public-sector institutions seek to reduce costs while 
still delivering an expected level of service to their benefactors (Rainey, 1983).  The 
savings in transportation costs does go a long way in defining the time period necessary to 
produce a return on investment from an investment in additional tool and IMRL items, but 
for a full valuation of the supplementary assets to the air wing, additional attributes must 
be considered. 
b. Ease of Use 
The ease-of-use factor for multiple sets of IMRL and tool assets considers 
the dividends resulting from reducing the man-hours necessary to pack and transport 
assets from one location to another several times throughout the year.  By purchasing an 
entire or partial duplicated set of maintenance materials for each location, man-hours will 
not have to be expended at the beginning and end of each deployment cycle to prepare the 
site-specific assets for transportation.  The transportation of the items does not increase 
their value in any way and should, therefore, be considered waste (Six Sigma Service, 
2006).  The newly available time that was previously used for pack-up can now be 
devoted to value-added activities, such as professional development of the maintenance 
workforce or upkeep of squadron spaces.  
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However, if additional assets were to be purchased and stored during 
periods of non-use, additional labor would be expended in cataloging, preventative 
maintenance, and general upkeep of the added items.  There are two methods in which the 
time devoted to upkeep of additional assets could be recorded.  One option is that the man-
hours necessary for this upkeep could be deducted from the time savings proposed in the 
previous paragraph and considered a cost due to the additional work generated by a 
change in the authorized equipment allotment.  An alternate viewpoint would be to 
consider this additional labor as value added because it would contribute to enhanced 
readiness by making the necessary maintenance aids available at their intended point of 
use.   
c. Spare Parts 
The benefit of having a duplicate set of assets available for maintenance in 
the event that the primary assets were unavailable due to scheduled maintenance, such as a 
calibration, or in the event they were to simply fail, can be approached from the standpoint 
of operational availability.  The predicted operational availability of a system can be 
broken down into two components: the mean time between failures (MTBF) and the mean 
down time (MDT).  The MTBF represents the reliability of the system because it 
quantifies the duration of failure-free operation that the system can provide under specific 
conditions (Chief of Naval Operations, 2003).  The MDT puts the amount of time the 
system is unavailable, or downtime, into quantitative terms (Chief of Naval Operations, 
2003).  The mathematical relationship between these terms is shown in the following 
equation: Ao = MTBF/(MTBF + MDT) (Chief of Naval Operations, 2003). 
The MDT itself is composed of two characterizations of time, the mean 
time to repair (MTTR) and the mean logistics delay time (MLDT; Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2003).  The MTTR is an average measurement of the time it takes to return 
the system to an operational status if all the materials and resources necessary for the 
repair action are present and available (Chief of Naval Operations, 2003).  The MLDT, on 
the other hand, is an average measure of the time to procure the necessary resources for 
the proposed repair through the applicable logistics support system (Chief of Naval 
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Operations, 2003).  The relationship between these terms is represented by the equation: 
MDT=MTTR+MLDT (Chief of Naval Operations, 2003). 
Finally, the MLDT can be further decomposed into the mean supply 
response time (MSRT), the mean administrative delay time (MAdmDT), the mean down 
time for training (MDFT), the mean down time for documentation (MDTD), and the mean 
down time for other reasons (MDTOR; Chief of Naval Operations, 2003).  Of these terms, 
the one of primary concern within the scope of this thesis is the MSRT because it 
represents the average amount of time the system is down per maintenance action due to 
procuring both the spare and replacement parts necessary for the task (Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2003).  This measurement takes into account procurements from both onboard 
the ship/station and those that are referred to another activity for completion.  The 
paramount importance of this concept is proven by the reality that the MSRT is 
overwhelmingly the largest driver of MLDT and, therefore, has more impact on 
operational availability than any other cause (Chief of Naval Operations, 2003, p. 75).  
d. Enhanced Readiness 
An increase in spare IMRL and tool assets contributes not only to an 
increased availability for those items, but also, and more importantly, to the ability of the 
supported air wing to execute the missions and training exercises to which it has been 
assigned.  However, this enhanced readiness is predicated on the assumption that the 
assets assigned in enhanced numbers are essential to maintenance actions on the air wing’s 
aircraft.  Care must be taken when determining which assets, if any, are to be duplicated 
so that superfluous items that are not required for routine maintenance are not purchased 
in quantities greater than necessary to achieve their expected benefit.  The correct 
estimation of this utility is facilitated by the fact that the air wing operates as one unified 
team rather than as a disconnected collection of discrete assets.  Although an item can be 
proven to be used only infrequently over the course of a standard year and, therefore, is 
delineated as a non-common use item, it cannot be eliminated entirely from the material 
equipage authorized to the air wing as a whole. However, it can be designated as an item 
that will become the responsibility of one squadron that then sub-custodies the asset to 
other activities under local guidance.  This sharing of material, if it could be accomplished 
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at the local level without off-station authorization for individual transactions, has the 
potential to enhance operational effectiveness while also reducing asset line-item 
requirements.    
e. Prevention of Damage 
An indirect result of moving the large CVW-5 IMRL and tool equipage 
from homeport to the deployment platform multiple times throughout the year is that it is 
exposed to excess wear, above and beyond what it was designed to withstand.  On every 
occasion that the material in question is packed, unpacked, or physically removed from its 
present location, there is a possibility, however remote, that it may experience some form 
of damage during the transit that it would have been immune from if it had been left in its 
original location.  Due to the addition rule of statistics represented by the equation P(A or 
B) = P(A) + P(B) – P(A and B), the very small probability of damage that the assets are 
exposed to in each aspect of the transportation process will gradually accrue into a larger 
probability of damage occurring to the items at some unknown time in the distant future 
(Buchanan, 2010).  
This concept can be more plainly expressed by the relationship between 
random independent events.  If the probability of two discrete events occurring is low and 
the researcher is interested in the probability of both occurring, then the probability of the 
two events would be multiplied and the resulting probability would be smaller than either 
of the two original probabilities.  For example, the probability of rolling a six-sided die 
and getting a three is one in six (1/6).  If this exercise were repeated twice, then the 
probability of getting a six on both of the rolls would be the product of each separate roll 
or 1/36, a much smaller probability.  Conversely, if the experimenter is interested in the 
probability of at least one six from either roll, then the result would be 1 - (5/6)(5/6) = 
11/36, which is a larger probability than either individual outcome alone. 
The theoretical underpinnings of the die-rolling example can be directly 
transferred to the subject matter of this project in which the probability of damaged 
equipment takes the place of a roll of the die.  Through procurement of multiple sets of 
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tool and IMRL assets, transportation cycles of the assets will be greatly reduced, and with 
this reduction will come an attenuation of the risk associated with movement. 
f. Morale 
The duplication of a portion of the IMRL and tool holdings of the air wing 
with the intention of reducing the amount of transport between operating locations could 
increase the morale of the workforce because it would eliminate repetitive actions that do 
not add value in the process.  The target of such an increase in morale would be a decrease 
in the defects that Sailors introduce to the process through a lack of ownership, which is 
induced by the reduced quality of life they experience when spending extra time on duty 
to repetitively pack and unpack items multiple times during the year.  To explain how the 
morale of the Sailors performing the actual labor associated with the movement of 
material could be improved through the purchase of supplementary assets, it is first 
necessary to describe how workers derive satisfaction from their work efforts.  
Subsequently, the reasoning behind why the workers believe working conditions that have 
existed in the past will continue at the present level, or will improve in the future, can be 
addressed.  
The motivational framework pertinent to explaining the impact on morale 
by the actions of management in this application is the Job Characteristics Model, which 
was developed by Richard Hackman and Greg Oldham (Ramlall, 2004).  The Job 
Characteristics Model examines motivation through the interaction of psychological states 
and job characteristics to determine how to explain to the observer in what way the task 
itself is instrumental to affecting the motivation of workers.  Of the three possible 
psychological states available under this framework (experienced meaningfulness, 
experienced responsibility for outcomes, and knowledge of the actual results), the state of 
experienced meaningfulness has the most bearing on worker morale as influenced by the 
elimination of non-value added activities (Ramlall, 2004).  The experienced 
meaningfulness of the work would be an attribute specific to each Sailor or worker in the 
endeavor and, therefore, would vary from person to person.  By extension, a reduction in 
motivation could be expected on the part of the workforce if workers perceived the 
shuttling of materials back and forth to standard operating sites as wasted effort, as has 
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been posited earlier in this thesis, and with that reduction in motivation could arise a 
corresponding reduction in effort (Kidwell & Martin, 2005).  Management could 
implement a program to increase the perceived task significance on the part of the workers 
in the event of such a reduction of experienced meaningfulness and expressed effort, but 
the application of such a plan is beyond the scope of this thesis, which will focus on the 
instillation of a high level of morale through an elimination of non-value added 
transportation activities.  
The unwritten and implied promises made to workers about the support that 
will be provided in the performance of their jobs are a form of social contract (Rousseau, 
1995).  Both management and the workforce must respect these agreements to enable 
business transactions to proceed (Rousseau, 1995).  By the same logic, if an organization’s 
success and, therefore, its existence are dependent on achieving certain goals, then the 
workforce must understand that its management is actively pursuing policies that move 
the collective towards those goals.  In a different form, the objectives that management 
sets down lead to pressure for perform on the part of the worker, but these objectives also 
can be interpreted as a contract for support on the part of management (Obolensky, 2010). 
The stated goal of an operational military squadron is combat readiness; therefore, the 
members of that squadron have a reasonable expectation that their efforts are directed 
toward activities that will improve the readiness of the squadron.  For the purposes of this 
thesis, the contractual obligation senior leadership has to the workforce in regards to 
morale is to provide tools and IMRL in a manner consistent with improved readiness. 
2. Upkeep/Preservation Personnel for Unused Assets 
The procurement of additional tool/IMRL items requires additional manpower to 
perform preventative maintenance on the assets, as well as to maintain them in a useable 
status when the remainder of the air wing has departed from the ship.  The additional 
manpower will be provided through an augment to the joint upkeep detachment, which the 
air wing establishes from temporarily assigned personnel provided by each of the 
component squadrons for maintenance of shipboard compartments during extended in-port 
periods.  The working supposition is that no additional maintenance personnel will be 
provided by the Bureau of Navy Personnel to accomplish the preservation of the 
 40
additional assets as the additional man-hours required to do so can be realized though 
tighter management and repurposing of the currently authorized squadron workforce.   
3. Cost Benefit Analysis 
The cost benefit analysis presents a consideration of five major factors that shape 
the life-cycle ownership costs of maintenance assets over a 20-year period.  By 
manipulating these variables independently, we can glean insight into how to structure the 
support package for effective and efficient operation. 
4. Risk Analysis 
Risk analysis is performed to represent how multiple transportation evolutions can 
impact the ownership costs of a maintenance support package in ways other than the cost 
of the transportation itself.  Oracle Crystal Ball simulation software is used to project the 
data over thousands of iterations so the true probability can be estimated. 
C. ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Frequency of Carrier Deployments 
The champion of our research is Brian Kudrna, the Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-
5)/Marine Activity Group (MAG)-12 Integrated Transition Team Coordinator for 
CNAF/CNAP in San Diego.  He recommended the use of a base estimate of four annual 
round-trip movements of equipment to the forward deployed naval forces (FDNF) aircraft 
carrier by CVW-5.  The direction of the movement would be four transportation cycles for 
embarkation of assets prior to the ship getting underway, and four cycles of 
disembarkation upon return of the vessel to homeport.  The number of transport cycles is 
necessary for generating a cost estimate relevant to the number of years required to deliver 
a return on investment for additional purchases of tool and IMRL assets.  If the number of 
evolutions where equipment were moved back and forth to the ship for deployment were 
to increase and/or decrease, then the payback estimates would vary accordingly.  
In addition to the routine deployments (both scheduled and unscheduled) that the 
united FDNF carrier and air-wing team undergo, there are additional deployment 
requirements that the air wing undertakes during the inter-deployment readiness cycle 
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(IDRC), which does not necessitate travel to the carrier but does require the transportation 
of IMRL and tool assets to the point of use.  These additional detachments do not 
generally call for the presence of the entire air wing, so the equipage authorized for each 
squadron is split between the mobilized element and the component of the squadron 
remaining in homeport.  Examples of these mobilizations would be the Strike Fighter 
Advanced Readiness Program (SFARP), which is used to prepare operational squadrons 
for deployments in which they coordinate the usage of weapons by sea-, air-, and land-
based assets; or Cobra Gold, a six-week exercise conducted jointly with the Royal Thai 
Armed Forces (U.S. Army, Pacific, 2012).  Because these operations do not involve the 
FDNF carrier, where the additional tool and IMRL assets would be located between joint 
deployment cycles, they can be discounted from the number of mobilization evolutions 
leading toward the duplication of assets, from a transportation-cost perspective.  The 
assets would not be involved in exercises such as the ones previously mentioned in this 
paragraph. CVW-5 fixed-wing assets would be supported by current assets, which would 
involve usage of the same level of transportation funding under either scenario. However, 
if the air wing were to get underway with the FDNF carrier for any additional unscheduled 
operational commitment above and beyond the currently planned four round trips, such as 
a humanitarian assistance or disaster relief mission, or an emergent regional security issue, 
then the cost savings gleaned from not having to transport the second pre-positioned 
IMRL and tool allowance would be spread over an additional evolution and would serve 
to quicken the return on the initial outfitting expenditure.  
2. Carrier Location 
The FDNF carrier and air-wing team has a unique operating challenge in that its 
standard supply chain stretches further than any other capital asset, by definition and due 
to the location in which the team is homeported (Commander, United States 7th Fleet, 
2012a).  All other aircraft carriers and carrier-deployable squadrons are located in major 
fleet concentration areas where there is at minimum one other similar class of ship or 
T/M/S of aircraft permanently assigned (Pike, 2012).  This localization of similar 
resources in the same geographic area leads to great economies of scale where multiple 
activities can be supported from a common pool of IMRL items and tools.  The FDNF 
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activities cannot draw on this pool of assets because their material entitlement is a “one-
of” entity.  By duplicating some or all of the IMRL and tool assets authorized to this air 
wing, there would be an enhanced readiness due to the availability of additional assets 
within the assigned geographic area of responsibility (AOR) so that the air wing would not 
have to contact units in the continental United States for asset replacements. However, the 
duplication would increase investment in assets that would be used less frequently than in 
other homeports. 
3. Air Wing Location 
CVW-5 is currently homeported at Naval Air Facility (NAF) Atsugi, Japan, but is 
scheduled to transition to operations at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, by 2014 (Singh, 2011).  As 
we discussed in Chapter I, the relocation of the air wing has been proposed for many 
years, and even after it was approved the execution date has been modified for a more 
lenient target of 2016.  The driving distance from the current CVW-5 homeport of NAF 
Atsugi to CFAY Yokosuka, Japan, where the FDNF carrier USS George Washington 
(CVN-73) is homeported is 35 miles.  The driving distance to CFAY Yokosuka from 
MCAS Iwakuni is a much larger distance of 542 miles.  Although the move is a planned 
and not an executed event, in this thesis we focus on MCAS Iwakuni as the home of the 
air wing for distance calculation purposes, as the initial impetus for IMRL and tool 
duplication was sparked by the deployment challenges posed by the additional distance 
between the air wing and its deployment platform. 
4. Air Wing Composition 
An air wing consists of four E/F Hornet series aircraft squadrons, and the tool 
allocation for each squadron is identical, and for practical purposes they are each assigned 
the same number of aircraft (12).  Although some squadrons list the assignment of 
13 aircraft, maintenance assets are only assigned on the basis of 12 aircraft due to the 
rolling requirement for one of those aircrafts to be out of reporting for depot-level repairs 
at all times.  Due to the mirroring of assets between different squadrons of the same 
T/M/S, computations done in this project are based on the equipage numbers for one full  
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Hornet squadron.  To achieve the impact of transportation-specific maintenance support 
asset costs for all the Hornets in the air wing, the output numbers are scaled up 
accordingly.   
5 Transport Medium 
The transportation medium we selected as the standard for the calculations in this 
thesis is based on the suggestions of Debord, Coleman, and Hodge (2011) in their thesis, 
which targets the best value analysis of movement strategies for CVW-5 from Iwakuni to 
Yokosuka, Japan.  In their project, they compared multiple options of personnel and 
equipment transportation within the general categories of sea, air, and ground material 
handling (Debord et al., 2011).  Although they immediately discarded some options as 
being unfeasible due to regulatory concerns, they retained others for further analysis to 
determine which was the most economically viable under a broad spectrum of scenarios 
(Debord et al., 2011).  Debord, Coleman, and Hodge (2011) did not advocate any “silver-
bullet” solution that offered the best characteristics of price and convenience in the final 
conclusions of their thesis, so in this thesis we selected surface trucking as a standardized 
basis for calculating transportation costs.   
Although the actual method of transportation is of vital importance for 
implementation purposes, its selection is beyond the scope of this thesis.  The 
transportation method is only pertinent to this analysis in that it serves as a basis to 
allocate the largest portion of the cost penalty from operating with a single set of IMRL 
and tool assets.  By standardizing the transportation option between alternative tool and 
IMRL purchasing scenarios, we perform meaningful cost-benefit analyses from a 
perspective that is standard throughout the exercise, as any variation in results can be 
attributed to the configuration of the materials transported rather than to the transportation 
method itself. 
6. Storage Availability for Additional Assets 
Our operating assumption regarding any additional tool or IMRL assets that could 
potentially be purchased in response to the recommendations of this research is that these 
assets would be provided storage space to remain on the FDNF carrier during periods that 
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the ship was in port and the air wing was disembarked to its homeport.  We base this 
assumption primarily on the consideration that the majority of the payback criteria we 
propose in this thesis relies on concessions gained from the prevention of transportation in 
order to calculate the efficiencies that would be earned from the purchase of additional 
assets.  By transporting any supplemental assets to MCAS Iwakuni, rather than leaving 
them in permanent squadron spaces on the ship, the factors that were previously 
considered as benefits would shift places on the balance sheet to become additional costs. 
The argument could be made to store the supplementary assets at another storage 
location on Yokosuka base, but that would not be a feasible location due to the crowded 
nature of the base.  Previous attempts to store IMRL items assigned to the USS George 
Washington’s ground support equipment (IM-4) division in facilities on CFAY Yokosuka 
during periods of scheduled selected restricted availability for shipboard maintenance 
have been met with strong opposition because the base does not have sufficient storage 
capacity to hold material in a climate-controlled location.  The IM-4 assets in the anecdote 
above were eventually stored on the flight deck of the carrier for five of the worst weather 
months of the year.  When the material was returned to its storage location, it was below 
par and caused considerable problems during the air wing’s next operational period. 
A more realistic but still unfavorable scenario for storage, if the material were not 
retained on the ship, would be to transport the additional assets to NAF Atsugi for storage 
in one of the hangars, which would be vacated by the homeport transition of CVW-5 to 
MCAS Iwakuni from NAF Atsugi.  Although the space would be available and the 
transportation costs and time to complete the transfer from Naval Air Station (NAS) 
Yokosuka to NAF Atsugi would be much less than to transfer to MCAS Iwakuni, there 
would still be costs associated with the move and wear and tear on the equipment, which 
would considerably accelerate the need for replacement. 
For these reasons, we base all estimates of cost savings in this thesis on the 
assumption that, if additional tool/IMRL assets were to be purchased, they would be 
stored on the air wing’s primary deployment platform.  
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IV. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this chapter is to serve as the quantitative portion of the research 
project where we analyze data gathered on the cost environment of an operational air wing 
through the usage of two analytical frameworks with the objective of providing a 
numerical component to the end recommendation of how the FDNF air wing should be 
outfitted for maintenance support assets considering their upcoming homeport change.   
The first framework we discuss is an analysis of how multiple transportation evolutions 
can impact the ownership costs of a maintenance support package in ways other than the 
cost of the transportation itself.  We use Oracle Crystal Ball software package to project 
the data over thousands of iterations so that the true probability can be estimated.  In the 
second framework, we present five major factors that shape the life-cycle ownership costs 
of maintenance assets over a 20-year period.  By manipulating these variables 
independently, we can glean insight into how to structure the support package for effective 
and efficient operation. 
A. THE RISK OF TRANSPORTATION 
1. Objective 
The objective of this section is to consider alternative tool/IMRL equipage 
methods of reducing exposure to risk of damage by balancing the transportation costs 
between ship and shore against the potential damage that comes through transporting 
assets.  The overriding consideration is to ensure that maintenance requirements can be 
met effectively and efficiently both when home based and when embarked on the aircraft 
carrier under all scenarios.  We explore how costs may vary by first dividing the items that 
would be transported into five categories according to their general susceptibility to 
damage.  The risk of any one item from the category being damaged while being 
transported is very small, but that risk, expanded to include the many CVW-5 assets being 
transported a minimum of eight times each year (four times to the ship for deployment and 
four times back to homeport after the exercise is complete), eventually compounds into a 
large probability that one or more items get damaged, destroyed, or lost.  The cost may be 
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derived by using a weighted average of the values of all the items in that category that the 
air wing owns and operates, assuming that no object in the category has a greater chance 
of being damaged than any other.  We can use the product of this analysis in conjunction 
with other transportation-related cost data to determine the most advantageous course of 
action for CVW-5 F/A-18 series asset support. 
2. Assumptions 
We list the general assumptions that cover our risk of transportation and life-cycle 
costs models in Chapter III, wherein the assumptions are specific to a risk analysis of the 
factors impacting transportation.  We have aggregated the data to damage incurred to one 
Hornet squadron, and we can extrapolate the values obtained to describe the total Hornet 
assets in the air wing.  
a. Tools and Individual Material Readiness List  
Tools and IMRL items can be separated into five broad categories 
according to their susceptibility to damage.  The categories for the maintenance support 
assets, along with their proportion of the total allowance by quantity are hand tools (50%), 
fragile hand tools (20%), power tools (12%), electronic test sets (10%), and calibrateable 
items (METCAL; 8%).  The maintenance-support assets that are more subject to damage 
are also, on average, the higher dollar-value assets.  For example, a socket wrench that 
falls under hand tools is much less expensive and also less likely to be broken during 
transport than a torque wrench, which falls into the METCAL category.  These are 
estimates based on discussions with six maintenance officers representing over 40 years of 
combined experience both at the work center level, where tools and IMRL are ordered, 
and the maintenance control officer level where funds are obligated.  
b. Damage During Transport  
Damage during transport also includes other negative scenarios, such as 




c. Traffic Accident Rate  
The accident rate that we utilize in this project is intentionally framed as a 
worst-case scenario.  Although actual accidents vary in severity, all accidents are assumed 
to be of the same magnitude for our research purposes: total loss.  We further assume that 
the government alone would bear the material loss that would result from a catastrophic 
traffic accident.  The costs due to loss of equipment in a highway accident are solely from 
the cost of the aviation maintenance assets themselves.  Personal injury and property 
damage to other parties is beyond the scope of this project. 
3. Methodology 
The number of trucks required to transport the entire CVW-5 maintenance material 
equipage is 24.  We consider just the five trucks needed for the amount of material to be 
transported for one Hornet squadron.  The squadron being transported is authorized a total 
of 4,311 items of tools and IMRL assets distributed among the five transport trucks with 
the same proportion per truck as that category comprises in the overall proportion of assets 
listed in assumptions.   
4. Building the Model 
We gathered data on the five categories regarding maintenance assets with the 
objective of describing the distribution of the data.  With the data of the mean and the 
standard deviation of the damage incidences in each category due to transportation side 
effects, such as mishandling, packing, and vibration on a truck, we estimated the 
parameters needed for a probability of damage risk distribution.  In the interpretation of 
our analysis, these damages are expressed as failure rates.  We selected the Weibull 
probability distribution because it is one of the most commonly used distributions in 
reliability engineering because of the many shapes it can attain; thus, it closely fits the 
requirement we have for modeling failure rates (Kececioglu, 1991).  The parameters 
needed for a Weibull distribution are the location, the shape, and the scale of the 
distribution.  In this circumstance, we used an approach called the method of moments; 
this is used to move from the mean and the standard deviation to the shape and scale 
parameters.  A detailed explanation of how to estimate the parameters of a Weibull 
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distribution with the method of moments approach can be found in the scholarly paper 
written by Mohammad A. Al-Fawzan, “Methods for Estimating the Parameters of a 
Weibull Distribution” (Al-Fawzan, 2000). 
Once we had the parameters for the Weibull distribution, we created a simulation 
using Crystal Ball for each trip and for each year per category of tools, for a total of 
800 iterations.  Then we multiplied the failure rate per trip of a particular category with the 
total number of tools for that category and divided by 100 in order to get the number of 
tools that were damaged on each trip. The total number of tools for each category was 
based on the approximate number of tools per load.  
We summed all the failures per trip per year to estimate the number of failures 
over the 20-year period.  These results forecast the distribution of failures over the 
20 years for each category.  With a Crystal Ball simulation, these forecasts showed the 
average failures per category, and we used it to know how many tools were going to be 
damaged for any period of time.  We also determined the cost of these failures by 
multiplying the total failures of a given category with the cost of replacing each unit.  We 
added these costs to estimate the distribution of the total cost of the damages over the  
20-year period.  With a simulation, this forecast showed the average cost of the damages, 
which we may use to determine the operating cost for any period of time. 
5. Accident Rates 
Additionally, to control the rates of tools failing due to the transportation, we also 
considered losses resulting from possible traffic accidents. We collected the information 
on yearly accident rates in Japan on roads similar to those used to transport tool/IMRL 
assets.  For example, in 2002, out of 79 million vehicles in Japan, 933,828 vehicles were 
involved in an accident, which leads to a rate of 0.012 accidents per vehicle.  This rate is 
true for most of the years in the period 2002–2011.  In 2006, the highest rate of 
0.015 accidents per vehicle was registered in Japan; in 2007, the lowest rate of 0.004 was 
registered (Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2012). 
We assumed that accident rates follow a triangular distribution with the minimum 
of 0.004, maximum of 0.015, and likeliest of 0.012 accidents per vehicle.  We chose the 
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triangular distribution because it is known to be useful when the actual distribution of a 
random variable cannot be determined, especially when the data are too expensive or 
difficult to collect (Glickman, 2008).  Because this is the annual rate, in our model we 
created 20 iterations for each truck.  We assumed the chance of an accident for one truck 
does not depend on the chance of the accident of other trucks; thus, the events of accidents 
are independent.  The total expected number of trucks that have an accident was calculated 
as the sum of all 20 iterations for all five trucks. 
Accidents can be of different degrees of severity, which may cause different levels 
of damage to transported tools.  As mentioned before, we considered the worst–case 
scenario of the most severe accident, wherein all tools are damaged and irrecoverable.  
Knowing the prices for each tool and the total expected number of trucks that would have 
an accident, we forecasted the cost of the damage due to traffic accidents.  
We can consider the above information in the decision-making process, regarding 
the total dollar amount needed to maintain the required level of tools supply for our units, 
or in order to calculate the maximum amount to be paid to insurance companies to protect 
against this risk. 
6. Interpretation 
Figure 12 shows the total costs of damage for the whole equipage of tools in the air 
wing when transported eight round trips per year for 20 years.  The chart incorporates the 
total number of expected failures for each class multiplied by the average replacement cost 
for that category.  The damage modeled here is only attributable to normal transportation 
damage such as mishandling, packing and vibration on a truck, etc.  Notice that expected 




Figure 12.   Total Damage Cost After 20 Years 
Figure 13 depicts the amount of damage that would be incurred strictly because of 
traffic accidents over the 20-year term of our analysis.  We used a 95% level of certainty 
as a measure of risk to estimate this cost.  As this analysis is a value at risk assessment, it 
is a quantile assessment of the risk due to accidents.  The way the chart would be read is at 
a 5% risk; the value of the accumulative damage is $1,919,463 for one Hornet squadron 
over 20 years.  The damage value to all the Hornet squadrons in the air wing is 
$7,677,852.  
 
Figure 13.   Total Cost of Materials Due to Accidents  
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Figure 14 is a tail value at risk assessment, or a conditional probability assessment 
based on 5% quantile data.  We produced the chart by filtering the outcome of the value at 
risk assessment to cover only the range greater than $1,919,463.  The outcome is the 
absolute worst-case scenario that should be protected through procurement funds to the 
amount of $1,935,531 for one Hornet squadron and $7,742,124 for all the Hornet 
squadrons in the air wing. 
 
Figure 14.   Total Cost of Materials Due to Accidents (Tail Value at Risk)  
 
B. LIFE-CYCLE COST ANALYSIS 
1. Objective 
The objective of this sensitivity analysis is to consider alternative tool/IMRL 
equipage methods to reduce total equipment ownership costs by balancing the 
transportation costs between ship and shore with the decision to purchase supplementary 
assets.  The overriding consideration is to ensure that maintenance requirements can be 
met effectively and efficiently both when home based and when embarked on the aircraft 




input variables to determine the most cost-effective course of action over a 20-year period.  
Through this analysis, we aim to determine the most advantageous course of action for 
CVW-5 F/A-18 series asset support. 
2. Assumptions 
We list the general assumptions that cover both models in Chapter III, highlighting 
the assumptions that are specific to the factors influencing total maintenance support asset  
life-cycle procurement costs. We aggregated the data to isolate asset requirement costs for 
one Hornet squadron, and we extrapolated the values to describe the total number of 
Hornet assets in the air wing.  
a. Individual Material Readiness List  
IMRL assets are estimated at a set value of $20,091,955 for each 
operational Hornet squadron. 
b. Transporting Items  
When items are transported, it is estimated that the process damages, 
destroys, or voids the calibration of 1% of the items during each trip.  This is a pessimistic 
estimate of the damage, assuming a worst-case scenario based on the authors 40 years of 
combined experience in aviation maintenance at both the work center level where they 
order the items to the Maintenance/Material Control level where the funds are expended. 
3. Methodology 
In our simulation, only one variable is changed per dynamic scenario; all other 
factors are held constant to isolate the impact of modifications to the tested value.  The 
input variables which were modified for analysis are: discount rate; currency exchange 
rates used on transportation procurement; quantity of assets duplicated; levels of 
asset quantity from pooling resources between Hornet squadrons; op-tempo 
measured by adjusting the number of scheduled and unscheduled deployments. 
4. Baseline 
The baseline scenario against which all other scenarios were compared was the 
proposed scenario in which a full duplication is done for all IMRL and tool assets for each 
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of the four Hornet squadrons in the air wing.  The calculation of this value is the least 
dynamic because the time-value of money does not come into play.  Under this scenario, 
as with all of the evaluated options, one set of tools must be purchased for the squadron as 
a start-up allowance.  The difference between this situation and the others is that a second 
maintenance package is purchased at year zero, precluding the transportation of assets that 
year or any other year.  The only costs that are incurred during this scenario are for the 
purchase of the initial outfitting requirement at double the standard level.  The analysis 
does not take into account the replacement of any tools broken through normal use under 
this scenario, because that is a factor that would occur across any scenario and can 
therefore be discounted from cost-benefit  calculations.  For example, if the squadrons had 
two sets of maintenance accessories, each of which was used half of the year, then they 
could reasonably be expected to break, in aggregate, as many assets from the two sets as 
they would if they were only using one set of assets for the entire year.  A separate figure 
that is germane to the discussion is the percentage of assets that is broken during 
transportation, if a full or partial set of assets is required to be physically moved from one 
operating location to another.  Under the model governing the remainder of our scenarios 
in this section, the breakage value would fluctuate depending on the number of trips 
required and on the percentage of assets transported each trip.   
It is important to note that, in addition to the routine deployments, both scheduled 
and unscheduled, that the united FDNF carrier and air wing team undergoes, there are 
additional deployment requirements that the air wing undertakes during the inter-
deployment readiness cycle (IDRC) that do not necessitate travel to the carrier but do 
require the transportation of IMRL and tool assets to the point of use.  An example of this 
type of mobilization is Cobra Gold, a six-week exercise conducted jointly with the Royal 
Thai Armed Forces.  Because these operations do not involve the FDNF carrier, where 
additional tool and IMRL assets would be located between joint deployment cycles, they 
can be discounted from the number of mobilization evolutions leading toward a 




because the additional assets would not be involved in the exercises listed previously; the 
non–carrier-based exercises would be supported by existing assets that are currently 
transported to all operating regions.  
5. Dynamic Scenarios 
The scenarios represented in this section have a single variable that is altered to 
yield the life-cycle cost of the support package under alternate input conditions.  We can 
then compare the resulting output against the baseline as a foundation for a quantitative 
cost-benefit analysis. 
a. Operational Tempo 
The operational tempo (OPTEMPO) could impact the life-cycle cost of the 
enterprise by resulting in extra transportation costs for each additional movement 
evolution to or from the ship.  If the air wing were to get underway with the FDNF carrier 
for any additional unscheduled operational commitment above and beyond the currently 
planned four round trips, such as a humanitarian assistance disaster relief mission or an 
emergent regional security issue, then the additional expense of having to transport the 
sole set of tool and IMRL assets would be applied in its entirety to more evolutions.  
Consequently, the more deployment evolutions that are executed, the less attractive the 
lower initial cost of utilizing a single set of maintenance assets appears over time.   
Conversely, if fewer trips between the deploying platform and the air 
wing’s homeport shore facility are executed in a given year, then the life-cycle ownership 
costs will decrease from the level projected for a higher deployment requirement.  It is 
important to note that the decrease in the life-cycle ownership costs from such a reduction 
of deployment evolutions does not drop below the magnitude of the baseline of duplicated 
assets until the annual number of trips drops to four, signifying only two shipboard 
deployments in a year.  Such a low deployment OPTEMPO is unrealistic for the Navy’s 
only forward deployed aircraft carrier, and leads to the notion that maintenance material 
purchasing decisions cannot be justified strictly from artificially varying the air wing 
OPTEMPO.   
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Table 1 applies actual numbers to the concept that more deployments will 
result in higher life-cycle ownership costs than fewer deployments due to the variable 
costs of transportation and breakage associated with moving a large number of assets 
overland.  The relationship between the number of trips in a given year and the life-cycle 
cost overall is also proven to be directly linear because the addition or subtraction of two 
additional transport evolutions, or one round trip deployment evolution, always results in a 
corresponding increase or decrease of $29.2 million. 
Table 1.   Scenario Summary Due to Change in OPTEMPO  
Current Values: 2 Trips 4 Trips 6 Trips 10 Trips 12 Trips
8 2 4 6 10 12





b. Partial Duplication 
The next variable that we examined was how the percentage of IMRL and 
tool assets for which a duplicate set was purchased impacted the total life-cycle costs.  The 
method we used to obtain these values was to vary the amount of maintenance materials, 
of which two copies were obtained, in increments of 25% to determine whether there was 
any relationship between quantity purchased and costs incurred.  As seen in the chart 
below, there is a negative correlation between the quantity of material purchased and the 
cost incurred over a projected 20-year useful life of the assets.  The two figures 
consistently move in opposite directions; an increase in the amount of assets duplicated is 
rewarded by an analogous reduction in overall life-cycle costs. 
Table 2 demonstrates that by increasing the quantity of assets duplicated 
and by extension the initial material costs, the additional funds that must be obligated to 
meet this raised level of material coverage is more than offset by the decrease in 
transportation fees and costs due to damage over the period of the investment. 
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Table 2.   Scenario Summary Due to Change in Partial Duplication 
Baseline No Duplicate 25% Duplicate Parts 50% Duplicate Parts 75% Duplicate Parts
1 0 0.25 0.5 0.75






c. Currency Rate 
For the calculation of the cost of not duplicating the maintenance assets 
over time, the largest component is the costs to hire a commercial freight trucker to move 
the IMRL and tool items, of which there is only one copy, back and forth to each 
operational location.  Funds required to replace items that are broken, lost, or damaged 
during the transit also play a factor, but the magnitude of that expenditure is far less than 
the transportation costs themselves.  As the geographical location of the two bases 
between which the material is transported is in a foreign country, the payment for 
transportation is made in a currency other than United States dollars.  If the American 
government were to purchase a fleet of trucks that could be made available for periodic 
air-wing transportation as well as other base requirements, then the foreign currency 
variable would be eliminated.  However, the cost of purchasing such a fleet of freight 
trucks is prohibitively high and is not economically viable even if used for other United 
States Forces -Japan requirements, other than strike force readiness.   
The unit of currency in which the usage rates for the freight trucks will be 
paid is the Japanese yen.  Financial trends over the past decade have seen a gradual 
strengthening of the yen in relation to the American dollar, resulting in higher expenses 
when expenditures are made in Japanese currency.  As the level of inflation in Japan over 
the same time period has been virtually zero, any changes in labor costs can be attributed 
mainly to exchange rates. 
The yen rate during the first few years of the millennium was in the 
neighborhood of 120 yen to the dollar, which gave the American forces the incentive to 
conduct more business with Japanese workers because of the favorable exchange rate; this 
factor is separate from the generally high cost of skilled labor in Japan.  The last few years 
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of the decade have seen a dramatic decrease in the purchasing power of the dollar in 
Japan, and a more typical current exchange rate is at or below 80 yen to the dollar.  Table 
3 depicts changes in the total life-cycle ownership costs for a single set of assets when the 
conversion rate varies by 10 points.  Such a fluctuation drives a difference in ownership 
costs of $449 million. 
Table 3 demonstrates an important lesson that can be learned from this 
model is that the global financial landscape is constantly shifting and assumptions made 
with out-of-date data are apt to be inaccurate.  When establishing a life-cycle cost for an 
investment undertaken in a foreign currency, contingencies should be made for the cost  
assumption to vary over time, or the final outcome will be artificially high or low, 
depending on which direction the exchange rate varies from the known amount at program 
inception. 
Table 3.   Scenario Summary Due to Change in Currency Rate 
Current Values: 83 Yen to $1 91 Yen to $1 111 Yen to $1 125 Yen to $1
1 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8





d. Discount Rate 
In a real government project, the figure would be pulled from the most 
recent version of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular Number A-94 
(Office of Management and Budget, 2012).  The discount rate applied is an important 
factor in determining the total life-cycle costs associated with the decision to purchase 
additional tool sets.  Discount rates reflect the degree to which both costs and benefits in 
the future are less valuable than costs or benefits today.  The selection of the proper 
discount rate can help the decision-maker choose the most efficient means of obtaining 
desired capabilities.  The initial discount rate provided in the baseline scenario is 2%, 




discount rate produces significant changes in the life-cycle cost, as demonstrated in Table 
4.  We have computed these changes using the scenario builder in Excel and provided the 
summary below.    
Table 4.   Scenario Summary Due to the Discount Rate 
2% 1% 5% 7% 10%





e. Shared Maintenance Assets 
All other scenarios covered in this document assume that each Hornet 
squadron in the air wing, although operating similar T/M/S aircraft, do not share 
maintenance support assets as part of its routine operations.  There is great redundancy in 
the material outfitting of each squadron because the tool container procedures manual for 
Naval aircraft do not take into consideration that several squadrons operating the same 
type of airframe will be operating in close proximity in an operational environment such 
as a ship.  In fact, the redundancy goes beyond the air-wing level and exists even within 
the squadrons themselves.  Because individual squadrons can operate in a detachment 
basis, they are required to maintain a certain level of tools and IMRL, depending on how 
many aircraft are attached to the command.  This excess inventory would be critical to 
cover all unlikely events if each maintenance department operated in total isolation, but 
when applied to the real world environment in which a forward-deployed carrier exists, it 
results in excessive inventory costs for unnecessary capacity.   
To determine whether there would in fact be a cost savings as compared to 
the baseline by reducing the amount of maintenance assets purchased, we calculated the 
total life-cycle costs under the current paradigm where each squadron is equipped with all 
the mandatory and optional tool and IMRL items for the number of aircraft supported, as 
well as for a scenario in which each full set of maintenance materials is used to support 
two squadrons rather than one.  As might be expected, the total life-cycle costs for the 
scenario where the assets are shared evenly in the squadron is half of the costs for sole 
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possession.  The attractive aspect of this concept is that it is the only version where total 
life-cycle costs are less than that of the baseline.  Although beyond the scope of this 
project because it would involve changing multiple variables at the same time, further 
potential for savings exists by sharing assets between squadrons within the air wing while 
simultaneously duplicating a portion of the assets to save on transportation funding.  The 
scenario summary of a shared maintenance assets situation is presented in Table 5. 
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V. CONCUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter serves to distill the information that we derived from the data on air-
wing maintenance material equipage support that we gathered during the literature review 
and analyzed in the quantitative portions of the document into a coherent recommendation 
on how to proceed with future material procurement doctrine.  In expressing the 
recommendation, we apply weight to specific assumptions; the overall conclusion that we 
derive varies accordingly.  We also identify and address special considerations pertaining 
to the current state of naval aviation.   
A. RECOMMENDATION 
Two of the most robust outcomes from the sensitivity analysis we performed on 
the five factors affecting the total life-cycle costs of maintenance support assets were that 
a full duplication of assets was less costly over 20 years than any form of partial 
duplication that required transportation, and also that a modification of existing tool and 
IMRL usage regulations to allow squadrons to jointly share maintenance assets has the 
potential to halve the ownership costs over a given time period.  The framework that we 
developed to investigate the impact of the fluctuation of a discrete variable does not lend 
itself to tracking the complex interrelationships formed by the simultaneous modification 
of multiple variables, but intuitively the combination of these two phenomena has the 
potential to drive even greater cost savings than the implementation of either in isolation.  
In practice, the implementation of one of these concepts could be used to fund the other, 
so through their application there would be no net increase to the total life-cycle costs of 
the maintenance support package overall; transportation costs would be eliminated while 
still providing a full complement of assets for maintenance requirements at each 
operational location.   
The concept behind this assertion is that a full set of maintenance assets should be 
available at each location to eliminate transportation costs, to have back-up assets located 
in the same theatre, and to discontinue the loss of maintenance man-hours in packing and 
unpacking the entire support package upon each deployment evolution.  The downside to 
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such a scenario is that for the plan to be implemented there is an up-front cost of 
$20.2 million for each Hornet squadron, or $80.9 million for the entire air wing.  These 
initial purchasing costs, however, are avoided by using assets that have already been 
procured to support the transition.  Under the current paradigm, each one of the four 
Hornet squadrons in the air wing possesses an over equipage of tools and IMRL items so 
that it can operate alone in any environment.  That requirement is not realistic insofar as 
carrier-based aircraft squadrons are in close proximity to other similar activities, 
precluding the need for this redundancy.  If the four squadrons were to break down into 
two pairs of sister activities that shared half of a maintenance material equipage, then the 
other full half of the equipage would be surplus and could be pre-positioned at the 
squadron’s alternate operational site.  In this method, full utilization is made of available 
assets at minimal costs.  Leeway does exist in this concept in that if there were not a  
50/50 split of the assets where the CAG leadership felt that slightly more than half of the 
assets were necessary to support an operational location, then the difference of assets 
could either be transported back and forth between deployment sites or a plus-up could be 
performed for those specific assets if it were more cost effective to do so. 
B. CONSIDERATIONS IMPACTING THE RECOMMENDATION 
1. Paradigm Shift 
a. Shift to Pooling Common Resources from Current Navy 
Culture 
There have always been inter-Service rivalries, such as the Army-Navy 
football game every year that creates a friendly yet competitive environment.  Rivalry 
exists not only in sports but also in many other facets of naval tradition and history.  
Officers are ranked against their peers, and these ranking have a great impact on whether 
that officer is selected for his or her next and higher pay grade and whether he or she 
successfully screens for command of a ship, squadron, submarine or base.  This type of 
rivalry and competitiveness carries itself over within the naval aviation community, where 
each individual squadron tries to outperform the other similar T/M/S squadrons on their 
respective coasts for awards.  This coastal competition comes from the fact that each year, 
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one squadron on each coast is selected as the best in its class by receiving the coveted 
Battle Efficiency award.  The Battle Efficiency Ribbon was established in July 1976 by 
Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf (Navas, 2008).   
The aviation Battle “E” is the Navy’s top performance award presented to 
the aircraft carrier and aviation squadron in each competitive category that 
achieves the highest standards of performance readiness and efficiency.  
The award recognizes a unit's training and operational achievements while 
including a balance that incentivizes efficiency. (Commander, Naval Air 
Forces Public Affairs, 2011) 
One of the main performance criteria that a squadron must perform well to 
be considered for the award is how well it performs on its aviation maintenance inspection 
(AMI), performed by the Commander, Naval Air Forces Aviation Maintenance 
Management Team (AMMT) every 18–24 months, depending on the squadron’s 
deployment cycle.  There are 41 NAMP programs and processes that are evaluated during 
these inspections that last from three to five days.  In 2010, the most recent year for which 
data is available, the TCP at the organizational level was ranked as the 10th NAMP 
program most often graded as off track or in need of more attention by CNAF AMMTs 
(Rosas, 2012).  Additionally in 2010, the Support Equipment Planned Maintenance 
System (SEPMS) program, of which IMRL plays a significant role, was ranked as the fifth 
NAMP program most often graded as off-track or in need of more attention by CNAF 
AMMTs (Rosas, 2012).  Failing any of these two programs leads to a decrease in the 
squadron’s final grade on the inspection which, if included with other off-track or needs-
more-attention programs, can take a squadron out of contention for the Battle Efficiency 
award.  Because competition is fierce, each squadron goes to great lengths to ensure that 
its 41 NAMP programs and processes are in the best shape possible.  Commands who 
receive the Battle Efficiency award are held to the pinnacle of esteem in their respective 
aviation communities, which tremendously impacts the periodic fitness reports for 
commanding officers and maintenance officers.  The way in which the metric leading to 
the selection of the recipient of the Battle Efficiency award is calculated severely 
discourages similar squadrons to share their assets because they are in direct competition 
with one another.  There must be a paradigm shift for squadron’s to share limited NAE 
resources. 
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b. Navy and Marine Corps Joint Management of Support Assets 
when Collocated 
With the relocation of the CVW-5 fixed-wing aircraft from NAF Atsugi to 
MCAS Iwakuni, there are redundancy possibilities that come into play.  Although MCAS 
Iwakuni is a Marine base, the Marine hornet squadrons have Hornet aircraft assigned.  
Presently, they have the F/A-18 C/D legacy Hornets, but these assets are still Hornets, and 
their tool and IMRL support composition is very similar.  In fact, the Marine Corps TCP is 
the exact same as the one administered by their Navy counterparts because the aircraft 
specific tool control manuals that guide maintenance and the overall NAMP direction is 
shared by the two components.  The tool control manual does not differentiate among 
Hornet versions; there is only one manual that is titled Aircraft Tool Control Manual, 
Navy and Marine Corps Model FA-18 (Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, 
2007).  Sharing duplicate resources could provide a win-win scenario for both the Navy 
and the Marine Corps if inter-Service rivalries can be overcome.   
c. Compliance 
Several recommendations proposed in this literature run counter the 
standard operating procedures of the NAMP and would therefore require approval from 
higher authority prior to implementation.  An example of such a procedure would be 
tailoring the allocation of assets to a squadron as a different quantity than the one based on 
the number of assigned aircraft per the applicable T/M/S TCP manual.  Such a procedure 
would require buy-in from all the pertinent stakeholders and approval by CNAF Code 
N422.  Detailed procedures for requesting an NAMP deviation are provided in Section 
1.1.4.3.2 of the first chapter of the NAMP, where an overview of the instruction as well as 
a description of aviation maintenance organizational levels is offered (CNAF, 2009). 
However, prior to any submission of a formal deviation request, the 
individuals submitting the request should be working in close coordination with the 
leadership of the AMMT, who represent CNAF Code N422C1 (CNAF, 2009).  The 
AMMT teams are charged with the evaluation of performance in aircraft maintenance 
activities and the identification of areas that require modifications in behavior to maintain 
efficiency, to promote safety, and to facilitate compliance with the NAMP and any 
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situation-specific instructions (CNAF, 2009).  As such, the AMMT teams are all 
composed of subject-matter experts in the myriad disciplines covered by the umbrella of 
aviation maintenance and are uniquely qualified to give advice into what departures from 
standard operating procedures constitute a situational deviation or a broad-scale change 
that applies to all activities performing maintenance on aircraft or aircraft components.  
Another benefit of involving the AMMT leadership early in the planning process of any 
prospective changes or deviations to the NAMP or other instructions is that the AMMT 
team is also the entity that performs the periodic AMIs and maintenance program assist 
(MPA) visits to operational commands (CNAF, 2009).  By soliciting their 
recommendations early into the regulation modification process, confusion can be avoided 
as to what standards the activity will be evaluated on during its cyclic performance and 
compliance evaluations. 
d. Evolution of the Nuclear Aircraft Carrier Deck-Load 
Configuration 
The footprint of the carrier air wing has changed dramatically in the past 
21 years.  In 1991, when Operation Desert Storm was underway, a typical aircraft carrier’s 
fixed-wing assets consisted of the following types of squadrons: F/A-18 Hornet; A-6E 
Intruder; F-14 Tomcat; S-3 Viking; and E-2C Hawkeye.  This air-wing configuration is 
what was used for CVW-1, which was deployed aboard the USS America (CV 66; Strike 
Fighter Squadron Eighty-Two, 2006).  During Desert Storm, there was typically one 
Hornet squadron that performed both strike fighter and attack capabilities, two F-14 
Tomcat squadrons that provided fighter and close air support, one S-3 Viking squadron 
used to identify and track enemy submarines, and one A-6E squadron used for attack.  
Each of these squadrons had a complete set of tools and IMRL that it transported to and 
from the ship every deployment.  At the time, the self-sufficiency concept made sense 
because other than the aging F-14 Tomcat squadrons, each squadron was the only one of 
its type aboard the carrier with the closest similar squadron possibly 12,450 miles away.  
In 2015/6, the new and improved air-wing footprint of CVW-5 will consist of three F/A-
18E squadrons, one F/A-18F squadron, and one F/A-18G squadron that will be employed 
to accomplish the same missions as the previous air-wing configuration.  The main 
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difference the constituency update presents is that there are now redundancies and 
multiple duplications of similar assets among these Hornets squadrons.  Other than the 
type mission that the Hornets are assigned, they are basically still Hornets utilizing the 
same type tools and IMRL as each other and within close proximity of each other, never to 
exceed the length of the flight deck, or 1,092 feet (Schultz, 2012).  There are some 
differences in tools and IMRL outfitting between the different configurations of aircraft, 
but the majority of the support items are the same.  Based on these factors, we argue for a 
pooling of resources to prevent excess expenditures related to non-mission enhancing 
redundancies. 
2. Discount-Rate Selection 
We selected the 2% discount rate as the default in our analysis because it is the rate 
directed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the 2012 augment to Circular 
Number A-94 (Office of Management and Budget, 2012).  Although the usage of this 
essentially risk-free rate may be in line with standard procedures for calculating the net 
present value of a long-term government investment, it would be wise for a logistician 
who is making the decision on how to allocate resources for aviation maintenance support 
to consider other numbers for the discount rate simply because this variable has more 
impact on the eventual life-cycle cost calculation than any other term.  Small raises in the 
selected discount rate will result in much lower total life-cycle ownership costs, while a 
decrease in the discount rate by even a small amount will drastically increase the life-cycle 
ownership costs of the enterprise (see Table 4). 
Whether to use the discount rate that the OMB circular advocates or to depart from 
that recommendation depends on how damage is weighted in the analysis.  If there is to be 
no further risk analysis in the assessment, then the risk of the scenario should be factored 
into the discount rate to take into account the unknowns the future will hold, such as 
fluctuating foreign currency rates or extreme variation in the projected deployment 
OPTEMPO.  Conversely, if further risk analysis is performed with a data product 
calculated using the discount rate as a variable to determine total projected life-cycle costs, 
then the risk-free rate listed in the OMB circular is appropriate because it would prevent 
the double counting of risk in the final estimation.  We provide this recommendation for 
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the benefit of future researchers so that the uncertainty of life-cycle costs is not over- or 
under-weighed when making procurement decisions. 
3. Research Continuation 
The objective of this analysis was to make recommendations as to how IMRL and 
tools were to be procured for the FDNF air wing’s maintenance support package.  We 
proposed a scenario in which all of the IMRL and tool assets would be duplicated, and we 
then sought to determine whether such a full duplication was warranted, or whether the 
government would be better served with a partial duplication or no duplication at all, 
which is the current paradigm.  The results from modeling different scenarios showed that 
in certain circumstances, full duplication is favorable; although when conditions were 
slightly modified, a partial duplication then yielded a lower total life-cycle cost.  Under no 
scenario did abstaining from any duplication and pursuing a plan of strict transportation of 
one set of assets yields the lowest ownership costs when taken over a 20-year period.  The 
partial and full duplication plans do not need any further explanation because their very 
names detail exactly how they will be prosecuted, but at this juncture a recommendation 
on how the partial duplication plan could be prosecuted is warranted. 
Although beyond the scope of this document, the sources that we utilized in our 
analysis have provided relevant  information on maintenance support asset costs to include  
the weight and cube size of all items used to maintain a Hornet squadron, both IMRL and 
tools.  We recommend that if maintenance leadership were to pursue the option of 
partially duplicating the material support package for the FDNF air wing that they solicit a 
further study into which items should be duplicated and which items should be transported 
based on the cost data used in this document, as well as the dimensional data that was 
obtained as a byproduct.  A unique opportunity for this follow-on project is represented in 
the current Naval Postgraduate School student body as two aerospace maintenance duty 
officers with extensive organizational level maintenance experience.  Additionally, the 
completion of an FDNF maintenance material control officer tour is in the Business 
School pipeline for 827 logistics MBA completion.  This project, as well as its supporting 
data, will be forwarded to these students for research continuity. 
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C. TOTAL LIFE-CYCLE OWNERSHIP COSTS  
The total life-cycle ownership costs upon initial outfitting for the maintenance 
support assets of four Hornet squadrons with a full duplication of resources and therefore 
no transport costs is $80.9 million.  When resource sharing between sister squadrons is 
factored into the scenario, then the total life-cycle ownership costs with full duplication 
and no transport for four squadrons split into two groups of two is $40.4 million, resulting 
in a cost savings of the same magnitude as the expenditure.  This savings is taking into 
consideration that a full set of assets will be purchased for the establishment of a new air 
wing, which is not the case for our project because a full four-squadron outfitting is 
already possessed.  For an established air wing, the savings over 20 years would actually 
be the net present value of potential transportation costs because two full sets of 
maintenance assets would already be located at the primary operational locations.  We 
calculated the projected 20-year cost savings figure returned by our quantitative model to 
be $110 million.  This number represents only the possible cost savings for CVW-5, but 
the central concept of pooling resources would also be able to be applied to future sharing 
of resources among other carrier deploying Hornet squadrons in NAS Lemoore.  The same 
model could not be applied to NAS Oceana home ported Hornet squadrons because their 
homeport is much more closely positioned to their deployable platform.  If all the tenants 
of our model were to hold true across the entire NAE, then the potential savings could be 
($110 million * 5 CVWs) for a sum of $550.5 million over 20 years for the five air wings 
home ported in MCAS Iwakuni and NAS Lemoore.  However, this model could not be 
directly applied to the four NAS Lemoore air wings because this simulation was tied to the 
time value of the transportation costs for Japan.  In that circumstance, the pertinent 
domestic transportation cost data could be applied to transportation costs in the continental 
United States where the transportation of tools/IMRL would exceed 300 miles from 
Hornet base to CVN home port in San Diego and Washington State. 
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